Course Syllabus

Economics of AI

Barcelona School of Economics · Emilio Calvano

Barcelona School of Economics

A 10-hour short course. Lecture slides are available on request from the instructor. Last updated June 2026.

The course is modular. Below is the full map of what was covered, arranged as a tree: open a section to see its subsections, and open a subsection to see the readings discussed there.

1What is AI?
aDefinitions and views

Readings

  • Poole, D., Mackworth, A., & Goebel, R. (1998). Computational Intelligence: A Logical Approach. Oxford University Press.
  • Agrawal, A., Gans, J., & Goldfarb, A. (2018). Prediction Machines: The Simple Economics of Artificial Intelligence. Harvard Business Press.
bMachine learning

Readings

  • Mullainathan, S., & Spiess, J. (2017). Machine Learning: An Applied Econometric Approach. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31(2), 87–106. doi
  • Athey, S. (2019). The Impact of Machine Learning on Economics. In The Economics of Artificial Intelligence (pp. 507–552). University of Chicago Press.
cReinforcement learning

Readings

  • Sutton, R. S., & Barto, A. G. (2018). Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction (2nd ed.). MIT Press.
  • Mnih, V., et al. (2015). Human-level control through deep reinforcement learning. Nature, 518, 529–533. (Atari / Deep Q-learning.)
  • Silver, D., et al. (2018). A general reinforcement learning algorithm that masters chess, shogi and Go through self-play. Science, 362(6419), 1140–1144. (AlphaZero.)
dFoundation models (a teaser)

Readings

  • Bommasani, R., et al. (2021). On the Opportunities and Risks of Foundation Models. arXiv:2108.07258. arXiv (Developed fully in Section 2.)
eKey facts and trends

Readings

  • Stanford HAI (2025). Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2025. Stanford University.
  • Perrault, R., & Clark, J. (2024). Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2024. Stanford HAI.
fEconomics in AI

Readings

  • Hardt, M., Megiddo, N., Papadimitriou, C., & Wootters, M. (2015). Strategic Classification. arXiv:1506.06980. arXiv
gEconomics of AI

Readings

  • Agrawal, A., Gans, J., & Goldfarb, A. (2022). Power and Prediction: The Disruptive Economics of Artificial Intelligence. Harvard Business Review Press.
  • Acemoglu, D., & Restrepo, P. (2019, 2021). Automation, tasks, and the direction of technological change. (AI as a substitute for cognition / labor.)
2Foundation models
aWhat is a foundation model? Capabilities

Readings

  • Bommasani, R., et al. (2021). On the Opportunities and Risks of Foundation Models. arXiv:2108.07258. arXiv
bCompetition in the vertical stack

Readings

  • Korinek, A., & Vipra, J. (2024). Market Concentration Implications of Foundation Models: The Invisible Hand of ChatGPT. Working paper (NBER; Economic Policy).
  • McElheran, K., et al. (2024). AI Adoption in America: Who, What, and Where. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 33(2), 375–415.
cWhat’s new: industry features

Readings

  • Stanford HAI (2025). Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2025. (Charts: parameters by sector, training cost, cost-per-performance, arena convergence.)
dAI partnerships

Readings

  • U.S. Federal Trade Commission (2024). Partnerships Between Cloud Service Providers and AI Developers. FTC 6(b) staff report.
ePartnerships: theory

Readings

  • Rey, P., & Tirole, J. (2007). A Primer on Foreclosure. Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 3, 2145–2220.
  • Jeon, D.-S., & Lefouili, Y. (2018). Cross-licensing and patent pools. RAND Journal of Economics.
3AI, jobs, and growth
aAI as a general-purpose technology

Readings

  • Brynjolfsson, E., Rock, D., & Syverson, C. (2019). Artificial Intelligence and the Modern Productivity Paradox. In The Economics of AI: An Agenda. University of Chicago Press. (Solow paradox; productivity J-curve.)
bJobs and tasks before LLMs

Readings

  • Brynjolfsson, E., Mitchell, T., & Rock, D. (2018). What Can Machines Learn, and What Does It Mean for Occupations and the Economy? AEA Papers and Proceedings, 108, 43–47.
  • Autor, D., Levy, F., & Murnane, R. (2003). The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4).
cJobs after LLMs: exposure

Readings

  • Eloundou, T., Manning, S., Mishkin, P., & Rock, D. (2023). GPTs are GPTs: An Early Look at the Labor Market Impact Potential of LLMs. arXiv:2303.10130. arXiv
dSystematic evidence (RCTs)

Readings

  • Brynjolfsson, E., Li, D., & Raymond, L. (2025). Generative AI at Work. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 140(2), 889–942. (Customer-support field experiment.)
  • Cui, K. Z., et al. (2025). The Effects of Generative AI on High-Skilled Work: Evidence from Software Developers. SSRN working paper.
eMacroeconomics: labor demand

Readings

  • Acemoglu, D., & Restrepo, P. (2019). Automation and New Tasks: How Technology Displaces and Reinstates Labor. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 33(2), 3–30.
fMacroeconomics: productivity and growth

Readings

  • Acemoglu, D. (2024). The Simple Macroeconomics of AI. Economic Policy; NBER WP 32487.
gAdoption

Readings

  • McElheran, K., et al. (2024). AI Adoption in America: Who, What, and Where. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 33(2), 375–415.
4Reinforcement learning
aThe Markov decision process framework

Readings

  • Sutton, R. S., & Barto, A. G. (2018). Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction (2nd ed.). MIT Press. (Chapter 1.)
bPolicies, values, and the Bellman equation

Readings

  • Sutton, R. S., & Barto, A. G. (2018). Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction. MIT Press. (Chapters 3–4; Bellman equations.)
cModel-free methods and Q-learning

Readings

  • Sutton, R. S., & Barto, A. G. (2018). Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction. MIT Press. (Chapter 6.)
  • Watkins, C., & Dayan, P. (1992). Q-learning. Machine Learning, 8, 279–292. (Convergence theorem.)
5Agentic markets: an overview

Readings

Overview and taxonomy — synthesises and sets up the readings in Sections 6–10 (agentic sellers, platforms, and buyers).

6Agentic sellers: pricing algorithms
aIntroduction: algorithms in markets

Readings

  • Chen, L., Mislove, A., & Wilson, C. (2016). An Empirical Analysis of Algorithmic Pricing on Amazon Marketplace. Proceedings of WWW 2016, 1339–1349.
  • Ezrachi, A., & Stucke, M. (2016). Virtual Competition. Harvard University Press.
  • Harrington, J. (2018). Developing Competition Law for Collusion by Autonomous Artificial Agents. Journal of Competition Law & Economics.
bPricing theory: commitment and competition

Readings

  • Brown, Z., & MacKay, A. (2023). Competition in Pricing Algorithms. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15(2), 109–156 (working paper 2021).
  • O’Connor, J., & Wilson, N. (2021). Reduced demand uncertainty and the sustainability of collusion. Information Economics and Policy, 54, 100882.
  • Miklós-Thal, J., & Tucker, C. (2019). Collusion by Algorithm: Does Better Demand Prediction Facilitate Coordination? Management Science.
cAlgorithmic collusion (Calvano, Calzolari, Denicolò, Pastorello)

Readings

  • Calvano, E., Calzolari, G., Denicolò, V., & Pastorello, S. (2020). Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion. American Economic Review, 110(10), 3267–3297. doi
  • Calvano, E., Calzolari, G., Denicolò, V., & Pastorello, S. (2021). Algorithmic collusion with imperfect monitoring. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 79, 102712.
dEmpirical evidence (German retail gasoline)

Readings

  • Assad, S., Clark, R., Ershov, D., & Xu, L. (2024). Algorithmic Pricing and Competition: Empirical Evidence from the German Retail Gasoline Market. Journal of Political Economy, 132(3), 723–771 (working paper 2021).
eField experiment on Amazon

Readings

  • Bramante, R., Calvano, E., Calzolari, G., & Schäfer, M. (2022). A field experiment on algorithmic pricing on Amazon (“Algorithms in the Wild”). Working paper.
7Agentic platforms: recommender systems
aIntroduction and sources of power

Readings

  • Aggarwal, C. C. (2016). Recommender Systems: The Textbook. Springer. (Chapters 2–3.)
bQuantifying the power of Spotify

Readings

  • Aguiar, L., & Waldfogel, J. (2021). Platforms, Power, and Promotion: Evidence from Spotify Playlists. Journal of Industrial Economics, 69(3), 653–691.
cRecommender systems: definition and economics

Readings

  • Amatriain, X. (2013). Big & Personal: data and models behind Netflix recommendations. Proceedings of the 2nd Int. Workshop on Big Data, Streams and Heterogeneous Source Mining.
  • Aggarwal, C. C. (2016). Recommender Systems: The Textbook. Springer.
dRecommender systems and competition

Readings

  • Calvano, E., Calzolari, G., Denicolò, V., & Pastorello, S. (2025). Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Recommendations and Competition. SSRN. doi
  • Lee, K. H., & Musolff, L. (2024). Entry into two-sided markets shaped by platform-guided search. R&R Econometrica.
8Agentic platforms: choice manipulation
aFramework: manipulating choices

Readings

  • Kamenica, E., & Gentzkow, M. (2011). Bayesian Persuasion. American Economic Review, 101(6), 2590–2615. doi
bInflated recommendations (Peitz and Sobolev)

Readings

  • Peitz, M., & Sobolev, A. (2022). Inflated Recommendations. RAND Journal of Economics, 54(4) (2025); working paper 2022.
cSelf-preferencing (Aridor and Gonçalves)

Readings

  • Aridor, G., & Gonçalves, D. (2022). Self-preferencing by a vertically-integrated intermediary. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 83, 102850.
  • Farronato, C., Fradkin, A., & MacKay, A. (2023). Self-Preferencing at Amazon: Evidence from Search Rankings. NBER Working Paper 30894; AEA Papers and Proceedings, 113.
dPlaying it safe (Calvano and Jullien)

Readings

  • Calvano, E., & Jullien, B. (2022). Playing it Safe: Reputation and Cautious Recommendations. Working paper.
9Agentic buyers

Readings

  • Calvano, E., Calzolari, G., Denicolò, V., & Pastorello, S. (2020). Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion. American Economic Review, 110(10). (Benchmark: agentic buyers facing colluding sellers; ongoing work.)
10Algorithms and public policy
aBroad policy challenges

Readings

  • Agrawal, A., Gans, J., & Goldfarb, A. (2019). Economic Policy for Artificial Intelligence. Innovation Policy and the Economy, 19. University of Chicago Press.
bWhy is AI different?

Readings

Conceptual discussion — draws on the theory-of-harm readings in 10d–10f.

cThe policy landscape: DMA, DSA, AI Act

Readings

  • European Union. Digital Markets Act (Reg. 2022/1925); Digital Services Act (Reg. 2022/2065); Artificial Intelligence Act (Reg. 2024/1689).
dApplication: tackling algorithmic bias

Readings

  • Cowgill, B., & Tucker, C. (2020). Algorithmic Fairness and Economics. (Prepared for the Journal of Economic Perspectives.)
  • Lambrecht, A., & Tucker, C. (2019). Algorithmic Bias? An Empirical Study of Apparent Gender-Based Discrimination in the Display of STEM Career Ads. Management Science, 65(7), 2966–2981.
  • Rambachan, A., Kleinberg, J., Ludwig, J., & Mullainathan, S. (2020). An Economic Approach to Regulating Algorithms. Working paper.
eApplication: tackling algorithmic collusion

Readings

  • Calvano, E., Calzolari, G., Denicolò, V., Harrington, J. E., & Pastorello, S. (2020). Protecting consumers from collusive prices due to AI. Science, 370(6520), 1040–1042.
  • Johnson, J., Rhodes, A., & Wildenbeest, M. (2023). Platform Design When Sellers Use Pricing Algorithms. Econometrica, 91(5), 1841–1879. (Buy box / price-directed prominence.)
  • Budish, E., Cramton, P., & Shim, J. (2015). The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(4).
fData-driven incumbency advantage

Readings

  • Hagiu, A., & Wright, J. (2023). Data-enabled learning, network effects, and competitive advantage. RAND Journal of Economics, 54(4), 638–667.
  • Bajari, P., et al. (2019). The Impact of Big Data on Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation. AEA Papers and Proceedings, 109.
gLooking ahead

Readings

  • Bramante, R., Calvano, E., Calzolari, G., & Schäfer, M. (2022). A field experiment on algorithmic pricing on Amazon (“Algorithms in the Wild”). Working paper.

References

Full list of readings, consolidated and alphabetical.

  • Acemoglu, D. (2024). The Simple Macroeconomics of AI. Economic Policy, 40(121), 13–58 (2025); NBER Working Paper 32487.
  • Acemoglu, D., & Restrepo, P. (2019). Automation and New Tasks: How Technology Displaces and Reinstates Labor. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 33(2), 3–30.
  • Aggarwal, C. C. (2016). Recommender Systems: The Textbook. Springer.
  • Agrawal, A., Gans, J., & Goldfarb, A. (2018). Prediction Machines: The Simple Economics of Artificial Intelligence. Harvard Business Review Press.
  • Agrawal, A., Gans, J., & Goldfarb, A. (2019). Economic Policy for Artificial Intelligence. Innovation Policy and the Economy, 19, 139–159. University of Chicago Press.
  • Agrawal, A., Gans, J., & Goldfarb, A. (2022). Power and Prediction: The Disruptive Economics of Artificial Intelligence. Harvard Business Review Press.
  • Aguiar, L., & Waldfogel, J. (2021). Platforms, Power, and Promotion: Evidence from Spotify Playlists. Journal of Industrial Economics, 69(3), 653–691.
  • Amatriain, X. (2013). Big & Personal: Data and Models Behind Netflix Recommendations. Proceedings of the 2nd Int. Workshop on Big Data, Streams and Heterogeneous Source Mining (BigMine).
  • Aridor, G., & Gonçalves, D. (2022). Self-preferencing by a vertically-integrated intermediary. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 83, 102850.
  • Assad, S., Clark, R., Ershov, D., & Xu, L. (2024). Algorithmic Pricing and Competition: Empirical Evidence from the German Retail Gasoline Market. Journal of Political Economy, 132(3), 723–771 (working paper 2021).
  • Athey, S. (2019). The Impact of Machine Learning on Economics. In The Economics of Artificial Intelligence: An Agenda (pp. 507–552). University of Chicago Press.
  • Autor, D., Levy, F., & Murnane, R. (2003). The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), 1279–1333.
  • Bajari, P., Chernozhukov, V., Hortaçsu, A., & Suzuki, J. (2019). The Impact of Big Data on Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation. AEA Papers and Proceedings, 109, 33–37.
  • Bommasani, R., et al. (2021). On the Opportunities and Risks of Foundation Models. arXiv:2108.07258.
  • Bramante, R., Calvano, E., Calzolari, G., & Schäfer, M. (2022). A field experiment on algorithmic pricing on Amazon (“Algorithms in the Wild”). Working paper.
  • Brown, Z., & MacKay, A. (2023). Competition in Pricing Algorithms. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15(2), 109–156 (working paper 2021).
  • Brynjolfsson, E., Li, D., & Raymond, L. (2025). Generative AI at Work. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 140(2), 889–942.
  • Brynjolfsson, E., Mitchell, T., & Rock, D. (2018). What Can Machines Learn, and What Does It Mean for Occupations and the Economy? AEA Papers and Proceedings, 108, 43–47.
  • Brynjolfsson, E., Rock, D., & Syverson, C. (2019). Artificial Intelligence and the Modern Productivity Paradox. In The Economics of Artificial Intelligence: An Agenda (pp. 23–60). University of Chicago Press.
  • Budish, E., Cramton, P., & Shim, J. (2015). The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(4), 1547–1621.
  • Calvano, E., Calzolari, G., Denicolò, V., & Pastorello, S. (2020). Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion. American Economic Review, 110(10), 3267–3297.
  • Calvano, E., Calzolari, G., Denicolò, V., Harrington, J. E., & Pastorello, S. (2020). Protecting consumers from collusive prices due to AI. Science, 370(6520), 1040–1042.
  • Calvano, E., Calzolari, G., Denicolò, V., & Pastorello, S. (2021). Algorithmic collusion with imperfect monitoring. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 79, 102712.
  • Calvano, E., Calzolari, G., Denicolò, V., & Pastorello, S. (2025). Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Recommendations and Competition. SSRN 4448010.
  • Calvano, E., & Jullien, B. (2022). Playing it Safe: Reputation and Cautious Recommendations. Working paper.
  • Chen, L., Mislove, A., & Wilson, C. (2016). An Empirical Analysis of Algorithmic Pricing on Amazon Marketplace. Proceedings of WWW 2016, 1339–1349.
  • Cowgill, B., & Tucker, C. (2020). Algorithmic Fairness and Economics. Working paper (prepared for the Journal of Economic Perspectives).
  • Cui, K. Z., Demirer, M., Jaffe, S., Musolff, L., Peng, S., & Salz, T. (2025). The Effects of Generative AI on High-Skilled Work: Evidence from Software Developers. SSRN; Management Science.
  • Eloundou, T., Manning, S., Mishkin, P., & Rock, D. (2023). GPTs are GPTs: An Early Look at the Labor Market Impact Potential of Large Language Models. arXiv:2303.10130.
  • European Union. Digital Markets Act (Regulation 2022/1925); Digital Services Act (Regulation 2022/2065); Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation 2024/1689).
  • Ezrachi, A., & Stucke, M. (2016). Virtual Competition: The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven Economy. Harvard University Press.
  • Farronato, C., Fradkin, A., & MacKay, A. (2023). Self-Preferencing at Amazon: Evidence from Search Rankings. NBER Working Paper 30894; AEA Papers and Proceedings, 113.
  • Hagiu, A., & Wright, J. (2023). Data-enabled learning, network effects, and competitive advantage. RAND Journal of Economics, 54(4), 638–667.
  • Hardt, M., Megiddo, N., Papadimitriou, C., & Wootters, M. (2015). Strategic Classification. arXiv:1506.06980; Proc. ACM ITCS 2016, 111–122.
  • Harrington, J. (2018). Developing Competition Law for Collusion by Autonomous Artificial Agents. Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 14(3), 331–363.
  • Jeon, D.-S., & Lefouili, Y. (2018). Cross-licensing and competition. RAND Journal of Economics, 49(3), 656–671.
  • Johnson, J., Rhodes, A., & Wildenbeest, M. (2023). Platform Design When Sellers Use Pricing Algorithms. Econometrica, 91(5), 1841–1879.
  • Kamenica, E., & Gentzkow, M. (2011). Bayesian Persuasion. American Economic Review, 101(6), 2590–2615.
  • Korinek, A., & Vipra, J. (2024). Market Concentration Implications of Foundation Models. Working paper; NBER Working Paper series; Economic Policy.
  • Lambrecht, A., & Tucker, C. (2019). Algorithmic Bias? An Empirical Study of Apparent Gender-Based Discrimination in the Display of STEM Career Ads. Management Science, 65(7), 2966–2981.
  • Lee, K. H., & Musolff, L. (2024). Entry into Two-Sided Markets Shaped by Platform-Guided Search. Working paper (R&R, Econometrica).
  • McElheran, K., et al. (2024). AI Adoption in America: Who, What, and Where. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 33(2), 375–415.
  • Miklós-Thal, J., & Tucker, C. (2019). Collusion by Algorithm: Does Better Demand Prediction Facilitate Coordination Between Sellers? Management Science, 65(4), 1552–1561.
  • Mnih, V., et al. (2015). Human-level control through deep reinforcement learning. Nature, 518, 529–533.
  • Mullainathan, S., & Spiess, J. (2017). Machine Learning: An Applied Econometric Approach. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31(2), 87–106.
  • O’Connor, J., & Wilson, N. (2021). Reduced demand uncertainty and the sustainability of collusion: How AI could affect competition. Information Economics and Policy, 54, 100882.
  • Peitz, M., & Sobolev, A. (2022). Inflated Recommendations. RAND Journal of Economics, 54(4) (2025); working paper 2022.
  • Perrault, R., & Clark, J. (2024). Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2024. Stanford HAI.
  • Poole, D., Mackworth, A., & Goebel, R. (1998). Computational Intelligence: A Logical Approach. Oxford University Press.
  • Rambachan, A., Kleinberg, J., Ludwig, J., & Mullainathan, S. (2020). An Economic Approach to Regulating Algorithms. Working paper; NBER Working Paper 27111.
  • Rey, P., & Tirole, J. (2007). A Primer on Foreclosure. In Handbook of Industrial Organization (Vol. 3, pp. 2145–2220). North-Holland.
  • Silver, D., et al. (2018). A general reinforcement learning algorithm that masters chess, shogi and Go through self-play. Science, 362(6419), 1140–1144.
  • Stanford HAI (2025). Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2025. Stanford University.
  • Sutton, R. S., & Barto, A. G. (2018). Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction (2nd ed.). MIT Press.
  • Watkins, C., & Dayan, P. (1992). Q-learning. Machine Learning, 8, 279–292.

Readings are mapped to the subsection where they were discussed in class. Some entries are working papers; bibliographic details may still be provisional. A printable PDF version of the full syllabus is also available.