Course Syllabus

Economics of AI

Barcelona School of Economics · Emilio Calvano

Barcelona School of Economics

A 10-hour short course. Lecture slides are available on request from the instructor.

The course is modular. Below is the full map of what was covered, arranged as a tree: open a section to see its subsections, and open a subsection to see the readings discussed there.

1What is AI?
aDefinitions and views

Readings

  • Poole, D., Mackworth, A., & Goebel, R. (1998). Computational Intelligence: A Logical Approach. Oxford University Press.
  • Agrawal, A., Gans, J., & Goldfarb, A. (2018). Prediction Machines: The Simple Economics of Artificial Intelligence. Harvard Business Press.
bMachine learning

Readings

  • Mullainathan, S., & Spiess, J. (2017). Machine Learning: An Applied Econometric Approach. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31(2), 87–106. doi
  • Athey, S. (2019). The Impact of Machine Learning on Economics. In The Economics of Artificial Intelligence (pp. 507–552). University of Chicago Press.
cReinforcement learning

Readings

  • Sutton, R. S., & Barto, A. G. (2018). Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction (2nd ed.). MIT Press.
  • Mnih, V., et al. (2015). Human-level control through deep reinforcement learning. Nature, 518, 529–533. (Atari / Deep Q-learning.)
  • Silver, D., et al. (2018). A general reinforcement learning algorithm that masters chess, shogi and Go through self-play. Science, 362(6419), 1140–1144. (AlphaZero.)
dFoundation models (a teaser)

Readings

  • Bommasani, R., et al. (2021). On the Opportunities and Risks of Foundation Models. arXiv:2108.07258. arXiv (Developed fully in Section 2.)
eKey facts and trends

Readings

  • Stanford HAI (2025). Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2025. Stanford University.
  • Perrault, R., & Clark, J. (2024). Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2024. Stanford HAI.
fEconomics in AI

Readings

  • Hardt, M., Megiddo, N., Papadimitriou, C., & Wootters, M. (2015). Strategic Classification. arXiv:1506.06980. arXiv
gEconomics of AI

Readings

  • Agrawal, A., Gans, J., & Goldfarb, A. (2022). Power and Prediction: The Disruptive Economics of Artificial Intelligence. Harvard Business Review Press.
  • Acemoglu, D., & Restrepo, P. (2019, 2021). Automation, tasks, and the direction of technological change. (AI as a substitute for cognition / labor.)
2Foundation models
aWhat is a foundation model? Capabilities

Readings

  • Bommasani, R., et al. (2021). On the Opportunities and Risks of Foundation Models. arXiv:2108.07258. arXiv
bCompetition in the vertical stack

Readings

  • Korinek, A., & Vipra, J. (2024). Market Concentration Implications of Foundation Models: The Invisible Hand of ChatGPT. Working paper (NBER; Economic Policy).
  • McElheran, K., et al. (2024). AI Adoption in America: Who, What, and Where. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 33(2), 375–415.
cWhat’s new: industry features

Readings

  • Stanford HAI (2025). Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2025. (Charts: parameters by sector, training cost, cost-per-performance, arena convergence.)
dAI partnerships

Readings

  • U.S. Federal Trade Commission (2024). Partnerships Between Cloud Service Providers and AI Developers. FTC 6(b) staff report.
ePartnerships: theory

Readings

  • Rey, P., & Tirole, J. (2007). A Primer on Foreclosure. Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 3, 2145–2220.
  • Jeon, D.-S., & Lefouili, Y. (2018). Cross-licensing and patent pools. RAND Journal of Economics.
3AI, jobs, and growth
aAI as a general-purpose technology

Readings

  • Brynjolfsson, E., Rock, D., & Syverson, C. (2019). Artificial Intelligence and the Modern Productivity Paradox. In The Economics of AI: An Agenda. University of Chicago Press. (Solow paradox; productivity J-curve.)
bJobs and tasks before LLMs

Readings

  • Brynjolfsson, E., Mitchell, T., & Rock, D. (2018). What Can Machines Learn, and What Does It Mean for Occupations and the Economy? AEA Papers and Proceedings, 108, 43–47.
  • Autor, D., Levy, F., & Murnane, R. (2003). The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4).
cJobs after LLMs: exposure

Readings

  • Eloundou, T., Manning, S., Mishkin, P., & Rock, D. (2023). GPTs are GPTs: An Early Look at the Labor Market Impact Potential of LLMs. arXiv:2303.10130. arXiv
dSystematic evidence (RCTs)

Readings

  • Brynjolfsson, E., Li, D., & Raymond, L. (2025). Generative AI at Work. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 140(2), 889–942. (Customer-support field experiment.)
  • Cui, K. Z., et al. (2025). The Effects of Generative AI on High-Skilled Work: Evidence from Software Developers. SSRN working paper.
eMacroeconomics: labor demand

Readings

  • Acemoglu, D., & Restrepo, P. (2019). Automation and New Tasks: How Technology Displaces and Reinstates Labor. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 33(2), 3–30.
fMacroeconomics: productivity and growth

Readings

  • Acemoglu, D. (2024). The Simple Macroeconomics of AI. Economic Policy; NBER WP 32487.
gAdoption

Readings

  • McElheran, K., et al. (2024). AI Adoption in America: Who, What, and Where. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 33(2), 375–415.
4Reinforcement learning
aThe Markov decision process framework

Readings

  • Sutton, R. S., & Barto, A. G. (2018). Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction (2nd ed.). MIT Press. (Chapter 1.)
bPolicies, values, and the Bellman equation

Readings

  • Sutton, R. S., & Barto, A. G. (2018). Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction. MIT Press. (Chapters 3–4; Bellman equations.)
cModel-free methods and Q-learning

Readings

  • Sutton, R. S., & Barto, A. G. (2018). Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction. MIT Press. (Chapter 6.)
  • Watkins, C., & Dayan, P. (1992). Q-learning. Machine Learning, 8, 279–292. (Convergence theorem.)
5Agentic markets: an overview

Readings

Overview and taxonomy — synthesises and sets up the readings in Sections 6–10 (agentic sellers, platforms, and buyers).

6Agentic sellers: pricing algorithms
aIntroduction: algorithms in markets

Readings

  • Chen, L., Mislove, A., & Wilson, C. (2016). An Empirical Analysis of Algorithmic Pricing on Amazon Marketplace. Proceedings of WWW 2016, 1339–1349.
  • Ezrachi, A., & Stucke, M. (2016). Virtual Competition. Harvard University Press.
  • Harrington, J. (2018). Developing Competition Law for Collusion by Autonomous Artificial Agents. Journal of Competition Law & Economics.
bPricing theory: commitment and competition

Readings

  • Brown, Z., & MacKay, A. (2023). Competition in Pricing Algorithms. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15(2), 109–156 (working paper 2021).
  • O’Connor, J., & Wilson, N. (2021). Reduced demand uncertainty and the sustainability of collusion. Information Economics and Policy, 54, 100882.
  • Miklós-Thal, J., & Tucker, C. (2019). Collusion by Algorithm: Does Better Demand Prediction Facilitate Coordination? Management Science.
cAlgorithmic collusion (Calvano, Calzolari, Denicolò, Pastorello)

Readings

  • Calvano, E., Calzolari, G., Denicolò, V., & Pastorello, S. (2020). Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion. American Economic Review, 110(10), 3267–3297. doi
  • Calvano, E., Calzolari, G., Denicolò, V., & Pastorello, S. (2021). Algorithmic collusion with imperfect monitoring. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 79, 102712.
dEmpirical evidence (German retail gasoline)

Readings

  • Assad, S., Clark, R., Ershov, D., & Xu, L. (2024). Algorithmic Pricing and Competition: Empirical Evidence from the German Retail Gasoline Market. Journal of Political Economy, 132(3), 723–771 (working paper 2021).
eField experiment on Amazon

Readings

  • Bramante, R., Calvano, E., Calzolari, G., & Schäfer, M. (2022). A field experiment on algorithmic pricing on Amazon (“Algorithms in the Wild”). Working paper.
7Agentic platforms: recommender systems
aIntroduction and sources of power

Readings

  • Aggarwal, C. C. (2016). Recommender Systems: The Textbook. Springer. (Chapters 2–3.)
bQuantifying the power of Spotify

Readings

  • Aguiar, L., & Waldfogel, J. (2021). Platforms, Power, and Promotion: Evidence from Spotify Playlists. Journal of Industrial Economics, 69(3), 653–691.
cRecommender systems: definition and economics

Readings

  • Amatriain, X. (2013). Big & Personal: data and models behind Netflix recommendations. Proceedings of the 2nd Int. Workshop on Big Data, Streams and Heterogeneous Source Mining.
  • Aggarwal, C. C. (2016). Recommender Systems: The Textbook. Springer.
dRecommender systems and competition

Readings

  • Calvano, E., Calzolari, G., Denicolò, V., & Pastorello, S. (2025). Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Recommendations and Competition. SSRN. doi
  • Lee, K. H., & Musolff, L. (2024). Entry into two-sided markets shaped by platform-guided search. R&R Econometrica.
8Agentic platforms: choice manipulation
aFramework: manipulating choices

Readings

  • Kamenica, E., & Gentzkow, M. (2011). Bayesian Persuasion. American Economic Review, 101(6), 2590–2615. doi
bInflated recommendations (Peitz and Sobolev)

Readings

  • Peitz, M., & Sobolev, A. (2022). Inflated Recommendations. RAND Journal of Economics, 54(4) (2025); working paper 2022.
cSelf-preferencing (Aridor and Gonçalves)

Readings

  • Aridor, G., & Gonçalves, D. (2022). Self-preferencing by a vertically-integrated intermediary. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 83, 102850.
  • Farronato, C., Fradkin, A., & MacKay, A. (2023). Self-Preferencing at Amazon: Evidence from Search Rankings. NBER Working Paper 30894; AEA Papers and Proceedings, 113.
dPlaying it safe (Calvano and Jullien)

Readings

  • Calvano, E., & Jullien, B. (2022). Playing it Safe: Reputation and Cautious Recommendations. Working paper.
9Agentic buyers

Readings

  • Calvano, E., Calzolari, G., Denicolò, V., & Pastorello, S. (2020). Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion. American Economic Review, 110(10). (Benchmark: agentic buyers facing colluding sellers; ongoing work.)
10Algorithms and public policy
aBroad policy challenges

Readings

  • Agrawal, A., Gans, J., & Goldfarb, A. (2019). Economic Policy for Artificial Intelligence. Innovation Policy and the Economy, 19. University of Chicago Press.
bWhy is AI different?

Readings

Conceptual discussion — draws on the theory-of-harm readings in 10d–10f.

cThe policy landscape: DMA, DSA, AI Act

Readings

  • European Union. Digital Markets Act (Reg. 2022/1925); Digital Services Act (Reg. 2022/2065); Artificial Intelligence Act (Reg. 2024/1689).
dApplication: tackling algorithmic bias

Readings

  • Cowgill, B., & Tucker, C. (2020). Algorithmic Fairness and Economics. (Prepared for the Journal of Economic Perspectives.)
  • Lambrecht, A., & Tucker, C. (2019). Algorithmic Bias? An Empirical Study of Apparent Gender-Based Discrimination in the Display of STEM Career Ads. Management Science, 65(7), 2966–2981.
  • Rambachan, A., Kleinberg, J., Ludwig, J., & Mullainathan, S. (2020). An Economic Approach to Regulating Algorithms. Working paper.
eApplication: tackling algorithmic collusion

Readings

  • Calvano, E., Calzolari, G., Denicolò, V., Harrington, J. E., & Pastorello, S. (2020). Protecting consumers from collusive prices due to AI. Science, 370(6520), 1040–1042.
  • Johnson, J., Rhodes, A., & Wildenbeest, M. (2023). Platform Design When Sellers Use Pricing Algorithms. Econometrica, 91(5), 1841–1879. (Buy box / price-directed prominence.)
  • Budish, E., Cramton, P., & Shim, J. (2015). The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(4).
fData-driven incumbency advantage

Readings

  • Hagiu, A., & Wright, J. (2023). Data-enabled learning, network effects, and competitive advantage. RAND Journal of Economics, 54(4), 638–667.
  • Bajari, P., et al. (2019). The Impact of Big Data on Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation. AEA Papers and Proceedings, 109.
gLooking ahead

Readings

  • Bramante, R., Calvano, E., Calzolari, G., & Schäfer, M. (2022). A field experiment on algorithmic pricing on Amazon (“Algorithms in the Wild”). Working paper.

References

Full list of readings, consolidated and alphabetical.

  • Acemoglu, D. (2024). The Simple Macroeconomics of AI. Economic Policy, 40(121), 13–58 (2025); NBER Working Paper 32487.
  • Acemoglu, D., & Restrepo, P. (2019). Automation and New Tasks: How Technology Displaces and Reinstates Labor. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 33(2), 3–30.
  • Aggarwal, C. C. (2016). Recommender Systems: The Textbook. Springer.
  • Agrawal, A., Gans, J., & Goldfarb, A. (2018). Prediction Machines: The Simple Economics of Artificial Intelligence. Harvard Business Review Press.
  • Agrawal, A., Gans, J., & Goldfarb, A. (2019). Economic Policy for Artificial Intelligence. Innovation Policy and the Economy, 19, 139–159. University of Chicago Press.
  • Agrawal, A., Gans, J., & Goldfarb, A. (2022). Power and Prediction: The Disruptive Economics of Artificial Intelligence. Harvard Business Review Press.
  • Aguiar, L., & Waldfogel, J. (2021). Platforms, Power, and Promotion: Evidence from Spotify Playlists. Journal of Industrial Economics, 69(3), 653–691.
  • Amatriain, X. (2013). Big & Personal: Data and Models Behind Netflix Recommendations. Proceedings of the 2nd Int. Workshop on Big Data, Streams and Heterogeneous Source Mining (BigMine).
  • Aridor, G., & Gonçalves, D. (2022). Self-preferencing by a vertically-integrated intermediary. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 83, 102850.
  • Assad, S., Clark, R., Ershov, D., & Xu, L. (2024). Algorithmic Pricing and Competition: Empirical Evidence from the German Retail Gasoline Market. Journal of Political Economy, 132(3), 723–771 (working paper 2021).
  • Athey, S. (2019). The Impact of Machine Learning on Economics. In The Economics of Artificial Intelligence: An Agenda (pp. 507–552). University of Chicago Press.
  • Autor, D., Levy, F., & Murnane, R. (2003). The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), 1279–1333.
  • Bajari, P., Chernozhukov, V., Hortaçsu, A., & Suzuki, J. (2019). The Impact of Big Data on Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation. AEA Papers and Proceedings, 109, 33–37.
  • Bommasani, R., et al. (2021). On the Opportunities and Risks of Foundation Models. arXiv:2108.07258.
  • Bramante, R., Calvano, E., Calzolari, G., & Schäfer, M. (2022). A field experiment on algorithmic pricing on Amazon (“Algorithms in the Wild”). Working paper.
  • Brown, Z., & MacKay, A. (2023). Competition in Pricing Algorithms. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15(2), 109–156 (working paper 2021).
  • Brynjolfsson, E., Li, D., & Raymond, L. (2025). Generative AI at Work. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 140(2), 889–942.
  • Brynjolfsson, E., Mitchell, T., & Rock, D. (2018). What Can Machines Learn, and What Does It Mean for Occupations and the Economy? AEA Papers and Proceedings, 108, 43–47.
  • Brynjolfsson, E., Rock, D., & Syverson, C. (2019). Artificial Intelligence and the Modern Productivity Paradox. In The Economics of Artificial Intelligence: An Agenda (pp. 23–60). University of Chicago Press.
  • Budish, E., Cramton, P., & Shim, J. (2015). The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(4), 1547–1621.
  • Calvano, E., Calzolari, G., Denicolò, V., & Pastorello, S. (2020). Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion. American Economic Review, 110(10), 3267–3297.
  • Calvano, E., Calzolari, G., Denicolò, V., Harrington, J. E., & Pastorello, S. (2020). Protecting consumers from collusive prices due to AI. Science, 370(6520), 1040–1042.
  • Calvano, E., Calzolari, G., Denicolò, V., & Pastorello, S. (2021). Algorithmic collusion with imperfect monitoring. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 79, 102712.
  • Calvano, E., Calzolari, G., Denicolò, V., & Pastorello, S. (2025). Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Recommendations and Competition. SSRN 4448010.
  • Calvano, E., & Jullien, B. (2022). Playing it Safe: Reputation and Cautious Recommendations. Working paper.
  • Chen, L., Mislove, A., & Wilson, C. (2016). An Empirical Analysis of Algorithmic Pricing on Amazon Marketplace. Proceedings of WWW 2016, 1339–1349.
  • Cowgill, B., & Tucker, C. (2020). Algorithmic Fairness and Economics. Working paper (prepared for the Journal of Economic Perspectives).
  • Cui, K. Z., Demirer, M., Jaffe, S., Musolff, L., Peng, S., & Salz, T. (2025). The Effects of Generative AI on High-Skilled Work: Evidence from Software Developers. SSRN; Management Science.
  • Eloundou, T., Manning, S., Mishkin, P., & Rock, D. (2023). GPTs are GPTs: An Early Look at the Labor Market Impact Potential of Large Language Models. arXiv:2303.10130.
  • European Union. Digital Markets Act (Regulation 2022/1925); Digital Services Act (Regulation 2022/2065); Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation 2024/1689).
  • Ezrachi, A., & Stucke, M. (2016). Virtual Competition: The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven Economy. Harvard University Press.
  • Farronato, C., Fradkin, A., & MacKay, A. (2023). Self-Preferencing at Amazon: Evidence from Search Rankings. NBER Working Paper 30894; AEA Papers and Proceedings, 113.
  • Hagiu, A., & Wright, J. (2023). Data-enabled learning, network effects, and competitive advantage. RAND Journal of Economics, 54(4), 638–667.
  • Hardt, M., Megiddo, N., Papadimitriou, C., & Wootters, M. (2015). Strategic Classification. arXiv:1506.06980; Proc. ACM ITCS 2016, 111–122.
  • Harrington, J. (2018). Developing Competition Law for Collusion by Autonomous Artificial Agents. Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 14(3), 331–363.
  • Jeon, D.-S., & Lefouili, Y. (2018). Cross-licensing and competition. RAND Journal of Economics, 49(3), 656–671.
  • Johnson, J., Rhodes, A., & Wildenbeest, M. (2023). Platform Design When Sellers Use Pricing Algorithms. Econometrica, 91(5), 1841–1879.
  • Kamenica, E., & Gentzkow, M. (2011). Bayesian Persuasion. American Economic Review, 101(6), 2590–2615.
  • Korinek, A., & Vipra, J. (2024). Market Concentration Implications of Foundation Models. Working paper; NBER Working Paper series; Economic Policy.
  • Lambrecht, A., & Tucker, C. (2019). Algorithmic Bias? An Empirical Study of Apparent Gender-Based Discrimination in the Display of STEM Career Ads. Management Science, 65(7), 2966–2981.
  • Lee, K. H., & Musolff, L. (2024). Entry into Two-Sided Markets Shaped by Platform-Guided Search. Working paper (R&R, Econometrica).
  • McElheran, K., et al. (2024). AI Adoption in America: Who, What, and Where. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 33(2), 375–415.
  • Miklós-Thal, J., & Tucker, C. (2019). Collusion by Algorithm: Does Better Demand Prediction Facilitate Coordination Between Sellers? Management Science, 65(4), 1552–1561.
  • Mnih, V., et al. (2015). Human-level control through deep reinforcement learning. Nature, 518, 529–533.
  • Mullainathan, S., & Spiess, J. (2017). Machine Learning: An Applied Econometric Approach. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31(2), 87–106.
  • O’Connor, J., & Wilson, N. (2021). Reduced demand uncertainty and the sustainability of collusion: How AI could affect competition. Information Economics and Policy, 54, 100882.
  • Peitz, M., & Sobolev, A. (2022). Inflated Recommendations. RAND Journal of Economics, 54(4) (2025); working paper 2022.
  • Perrault, R., & Clark, J. (2024). Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2024. Stanford HAI.
  • Poole, D., Mackworth, A., & Goebel, R. (1998). Computational Intelligence: A Logical Approach. Oxford University Press.
  • Rambachan, A., Kleinberg, J., Ludwig, J., & Mullainathan, S. (2020). An Economic Approach to Regulating Algorithms. Working paper; NBER Working Paper 27111.
  • Rey, P., & Tirole, J. (2007). A Primer on Foreclosure. In Handbook of Industrial Organization (Vol. 3, pp. 2145–2220). North-Holland.
  • Silver, D., et al. (2018). A general reinforcement learning algorithm that masters chess, shogi and Go through self-play. Science, 362(6419), 1140–1144.
  • Stanford HAI (2025). Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2025. Stanford University.
  • Sutton, R. S., & Barto, A. G. (2018). Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction (2nd ed.). MIT Press.
  • Watkins, C., & Dayan, P. (1992). Q-learning. Machine Learning, 8, 279–292.

Readings are mapped to the subsection where they were discussed in class. Some entries are working papers; bibliographic details may still be provisional. A printable PDF version of the full syllabus is also available.